Removal and Remand: When Does a Federal District Court Lose Jurisdiction over a Case Remanded to State Court by Furlow, David A. & Kelly, Kelly W.
SMU Law Review
Volume 41 | Issue 4 Article 3
1987
Removal and Remand: When Does a Federal
District Court Lose Jurisdiction over a Case
Remanded to State Court
David A. Furlow
Kelly W. Kelly
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
David A. Furlow, et al., Removal and Remand: When Does a Federal District Court Lose Jurisdiction over a Case Remanded to State Court,
41 Sw L.J. 999 (1987)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol41/iss4/3
REMOVAL AND REMAND: WHEN DOES A
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT LOSE
JURISDICTION OVER A CASE
REMANDED TO STATE COURT?
by
David A. Furlow* and Charles W. Kelly**
HE filing of a removal petition in federal court effects the removal of
a state court civil lawsuit to a federal forum. ' When a defendant files
the appropriate removal pleadings, 2 federal jurisdiction immediately
attaches, the statute places the state court's authority in a state of suspen-
sion, and the federal court possesses the power, but not the duty, to invali-
date all state court proceedings that have taken place between the time that
the defendant filed the removal petition in federal court and the time that the
clerk filed a copy of the removal petition in state court. 3 The federal court's
* B.A., J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Griggs & Harrison, Houston,
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1. In this Article the term "federal remand statute" refers to the civil removal and re-
mand aspects of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446, 1447 (1982). This Article does not discuss the removal
and remand of criminal cases, except as is necessary to compare and contrast the statutory
procedures.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), (d)-(e) (1982). The relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e), states
that the delivery of written notice of the removal petition to adverse parties and the filing of a
copy of the removal petition in the state court "shall effect the removal and the State court
shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded." Id. § 1446(e).
Little question exists that federal jurisdiction attaches when a party files the removal petition
in federal court. See DeMoss v. Kelly Serv., Inc., 355 F. Supp. 1111, 1113 (D.P.R. 1972)
(jurisdiction of federal court attaches when party files removal petition) , aff'd, 493 F. 2d 1012
(1st Cir. 1974). In Master Equip. Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 342 F. Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa.
1972), the court observed that filing a removal petition in the state court merely functioned as
a notice of the superseding federal jurisdiction and, in the event of conflicting proceedings
during the interlude before that filing, federal jurisdiction predominated. These facts indicate
that federal jurisdiction attaches even before completion of the removal proceedings in state
court. Id. But see Beleos v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 161 F. Supp. 627, 628 (E.D.S.C. 1956)
(until state court loses jurisdiction, federal court cannot acquire it). One of the purposes of this
Article is to analyze the ensuing proceedings in order to determine if state jurisdiction resumes
prior to the completion of remand proceedings in the federal court.
3. See Hornung v. Master Tank & Welding Co., 151 F. Supp. 169, 172 (D.N.D. 1957), in
which the court observed:
The state court acquired jurisdiction of the present action when the Summons
and Complaint were duly served upon the defendants in accordance with the
Nonresident Motorist Statute. That jurisdiction was active until the removal
was finally effected by the filing of a copy of the Petition for Removal with the
state court clerk. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(e). It then became passive or dormant,
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assertion of removal jurisdiction places the state court's jurisdiction in a
state of suspension until such time as the federal court remands the case to
state court.4 If the court finds that it does have jurisdiction and that the case
has been properly removed, or if the federal court dismisses the cause of
action in response to a party's motions, then the removal operates to termi-
nate the state court's jurisdiction.5 Any proceedings that occur in the state
pending disposition of the case in federal court .... Federal jurisdiction vested
for all purposes when the Petition was filed in this court, the later notice thereof
and the filing of a copy thereof in state court operating retroactively to "effect
the removal" as of the date of filing the Petition in federal court....
.. . The filing in state court functions as a notice of the superseding federal
jurisdiction; and necessarily, in the event of conflicting proceedings during the
interlude before that filing, the federal jurisdiction predominates.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Shenandoah Chamber of Progress v. Frank Assocs., 95 F.
Supp. 719, 720 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (even if state court holds default judgment, statute still allows
removal to federal court if properly filed).
State courts sometimes have taken a conflicting position and suggested that the state court
does not lose jurisdiction until someone actually serves the federal removal petition upon the
court and the plaintiffs. See Dorsey v. State, 171 Ind. App. 408, 357 N.E.2d 280, 282 n.2
(1976) (state court retained jurisdiction since no written notice or filed copy of removal peti-
tion sent to state court or to plaintiff); Schuchman v. State, 250 Ind. 408, 236 N.E.2d 830, 833
(1968) (state court loses jurisdiction when service of removal made on state court and plain-
tiff).
A number of federal courts also have held that both the federal court and the state court
retain active jurisdiction during the period of time between the filing of the removal petition in
federal court and the filing of a copy in state court. These courts, however, have not discussed
extensively the dominant jurisdiction of the federal court. See Berberian v. Gibney, 514 F.2d
790, 792-93 (1st Cir. 1975) (court held that both state and federal courts have jurisdiction until
removal process completed, but did not discuss doctrine of dominant jurisdiction); Windac
Corp. v. Clarke, 530 F. Supp. 812, 814 (D. Neb. 1982) (court discussed doctrine of dominant
jurisdiction, but apparently did not apply it).
Some courts have gone even further in ignoring the dominant jurisdiction of federal courts.
In Delavigne v. Delavigne, 402 F. Supp. 363 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 598 (4th Cir.
1976), for example, the federal district court held that the filing with the state court of a notice
of removal, rather than a copy of the petition itself, proved insufficient to divest the state court
of jurisdiction. 402 F. Supp. at 365-66. The federal district court concluded that the state
court actions that had occurred prior to the filing of a copy of the removal petition were not
void, but presumptively valid. Id.; see also McGoldrick v. ICS Sales & Leasing, Inc., 412 F.
Supp. 268, 269-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (sheriff's levy of property pursuant to state court's order
valid, despite fact that defendant filed removal petition in federal court two days before sheriff
acted); Ramahi v. Hobart Corp., 47 Or. App. 607, 615 P.2d 348, 353 (1980) (state court con-
tinues to have jurisdiction until copy of petition for removal and notice filed in state court).
4. Dauenhauer v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 2d 22, 24, 307 P.2d 724, 726 (1957);
State v. Lehman, 203 Neb. 341, 278 N.W.2d 610, 615 (1979).
5. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. App. 3d 670, 675-76, 183 Cal. Rptr. 330,
333 (1982). As indicated above, the state court's jurisdiction will come to an end under either
of two sets of circumstances. In the first instance, the state court loses jurisdiction if the fed-
eral court obtains jurisdiction as a result of a proper removal. Id. at 676, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 333;
see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. Alternatively, the state court loses jurisdiction if
the federal court determines that the state court never had jurisdiction over the lawsuit. For
example, assume that a plaintiff files a securities fraud lawsuit in a state court, and sets forth a
claim for recovery under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. 1987). One of two defendants removes the case to federal
court claiming that the RICO count invokes federal jurisdiction. The other defendant files a
motion to dismiss the RICO suit, because RICO jurisdiction is exclusively federal. See Broad-
way v. San Antonio Shoe, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 584, 586 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Kinsey v. Nestor
Exploration Ltd.-1981A, 604 F. Supp. 1365, 1371 (E.D. Wash. 1985). If the federal court
agrees with the second defendant's argument that RICO jurisdiction is exclusively federal,
then it must dismiss the entire lawsuit. Dismissal is necessary because the federal court's re-
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court between the filing of a copy of the federal removal petition in the state
court and the reinvestment of jurisdiction that occurs upon the remand of
the case to the state court are void. 6
In order to determine whether post-removal state court proceedings are
void, a court must ascertain when a case is remanded, which is to establish
when the federal court has returned the lawsuit to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the state court. Few commentators have written about the reinvestment
of state court jurisdiction during the remand process, presumably because
the statutory procedure appears to be very simple. Despite the straightfor-
ward language of the statute, however, federal courts have reached contra-
moval jurisdiction is entirely derivative, and the federal courts thus could not have acquired
jurisdiction from a state court that lacks jurisdiction. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1922). The federal court cannot even remand the case to
state court, but must dismiss it in its entirety. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 38, at 212 (1983). In this instance, however, the state court has lost jurisdiction of the case
just as if the federal court had assumed jurisdiction over the matter.
6. In the event of conflicting proceedings during the interim, federal jurisdiction prevails
over state jurisdiction, and many courts have held the actions of the state court to be a coram
non judice and absolutely void. Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118, 122 (1882). In South
Carolina v. Moore, 447 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1971), for example, Circuit Judge Clement Hayn-
sworth observed that:
It is clear, however, that § 1446, in providing for the filing of the petition in
the district court while promptly thereafter filing a copy in the state court and
giving notice to adverse parties was designed to make the removal effective by
the performance of those acts. The removal was no longer dependent upon any
judicial act in any state or federal court....
Since the adoption of § 1446, it has been uniformly held that the state court
loses all jurisdiction to proceed immediately upon the filing of the petition in the
federal court and a copy in the state court. Under these holdings any proceed-
ings in the state court after the filing of the petition and prior to a federal re-
mand order are absolutely void, despite subsequent determination that the
removal petition was ineffective. This rule has been accepted by numerous
scholarly commentators as a correct statement of existing law under § 1446.
Id. at 1073 (footnotes omitted); see also Johnson v. Estelle, 625 F.2d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1980)
(dismissal and remand of removal petition insufficient to reinstate jurisdiction in state court,
while second petition remained in federal court); United States v. Ohio, 487 F.2d 936, 943
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) (after removal, state court shall proceed no further unless re-
manded), aff'd sub nor. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975); Allman v. Hanley, 302
F.2d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1962) (upon compliance with § 1446, state court loses jurisdiction).
The state court's jurisdiction is not restored unless and until the federal court remands the
case. See Lowe v. Jacobs, 243 F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 842 (1957);
Styers v. Pico, Inc., 236 Ga. 258, 223 S.E.2d 656, 657 (1976); see also Adair Pipeline Co. v.
Pipeliners Local Union No. 798, 203 F. Supp. 434, 437 (S.D. Tex. 1962) (when parties have
met § 1446 removal requirements, state court can no longer proceed), aff'd, 325 F.2d 206, 206
(5th Cir. 1963).
Although the authorities generally agree, one court has indicated in dicta that a state court's
post-removal actions may be valid, rather than void, if the federal court determines that the
state court lacked jurisdiction over the removed case. Styers v. Pico, Inc., 236 Ga. 258, 223
S.E.2d 656, 657 (1976). That dicta is clearly erroneous because it validates the actions of a
state court that had chosen to ignore, and therefore undermine, a federal court's right to deter-
mine whether the jurisdiction that it was exercising pursuant to the removal statute should be
withdrawn. A federal court and a state court should not seek to exercise simultaneous juris-
diction over a case. Courts can maintain orderly procedure only if they hold void any state
court proceedings after the filing of the removal petition and prior to a federal remand order,
regardless of a subsequent determination that the removal petition was ineffective. South Car-
olina v. Moore, 447 F.2d 1067, 1073 (4th Cir. 1971).
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dictory conclusions about its proper construction.7
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF DETERMINING WHEN A STATE COURT
RESUMES EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER A REMANDED CASE
The purpose of this Article is to examine the rationale of the reported
decisions in which courts have determined when a state has regained juris-
diction of a previously removed case after it has been remanded. The au-
thors have analyzed these issues in order to determine what circumstances
signify that jurisdiction over the remanded lawsuit has passed to the state
court. The Article begins by examining the existing case law.
In brief, federal courts have ruled that state courts are reinvested with
jurisdiction after remand at three different times:
(1) immediately upon the oral order of the federal court to remand the
case to the state court;8
(2) upon the federal court clerk's mailing of the federal remand order to
the state court; and 9
(3) upon the state court's receipt of the federal remand order. 10 The dis-
tinctions may appear subtle, but they contain important consequences.
If the oral remand order immediately and irrevocably divests the federal
court of jurisdiction, then the entry and mailing of that order constitute
purely ministerial tasks, and the federal court is immediately without power
to reconsider, and to modify or vacate, its earlier remand order, even if the
district judge subsequently concludes that the federal court mistakenly de-
cided to remand the case. " If the federal court retains the power to vacate
its remand order at any time prior to the time that its clerk mails the order
to a state court, then the party seeking removal may still have an opportu-
nity to file and argue a motion to modify or vacate that remand order in the
time that elapses between the entry of the order and its mailing. If the fed-
eral court maintains exclusive jurisdiction over the removed case until the
state court's clerk actually receives a copy of that order, however, then the
federal court is entitled to vacate or modify its order at any time before the
state court's clerk receives the remand order and files it in the records of the
court. 12
The state court's reinvestment of jurisdiction clearly affects the rights of
parties in the remanded state court proceeding. If, for example, a federal
court's oral order of remand immediately and irrevocably divests the federal
court of jurisdiction and reinvests the state court with jurisdiction, then all
subsequent proceedings in the state court will be valid. If the remand statute
requires the federal judge to sign a remand order and to direct the clerk to
7. See infra notes 15-92 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 15-46 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 47-92 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
11. See Three J Farms, Inc. v. Alton Box Bd. Co., 609 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); Leslie v. Floyd Gas Co., 11 F. Supp. 401, 402 (E.D. Ky. 1935).
12. See First Nat'l Bank v. Langford, 570 F. Supp. 697, 698 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
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mail a certified copy of that order to the state court in order to divest the
federal court of jurisdiction, however, then any state court proceedings that
occur between the federal judge's oral order of remand and the clerk's mail-
ing of a certified copy of the remand order are void, because the state court
has not yet regained jurisdiction. Thus, the resolution of when the remand
order reinvests the state court with exclusive jurisdiction will determine
whether proceedings in the remanded, state court lawsuit, including any
judgments rendered therein, are valid or void.
II. THE LANGUAGE OF THE FEDERAL REMAND STATUTE
The statutory language for federal remand is straightforward and decep-
tively simple:
If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was re-
moved improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall
remand the case .... A certified copy of the order of remand shall be
mailed by its clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may
thereupon proceed with such case.' 3
A literal reading of the statute suggests that the state court may not proceed
with the case until its clerk has received a certified copy of the remand order
from the federal court, which would expressly authorize the state court to
proceed with the case. Most, but by no means all, courts therefore have
concluded that the state court may not reconvene a trial or otherwise recom-
mence proceedings until the federal court's clerk has mailed a certified copy
of the remand order to the state court, or until the state court has actually
received a certified copy of that state court order. 14
III. FEDERAL DECISIONS INTERPRETING THE REMAND STATUTE
A. Decisions Holding that the Federal Court Immediately and Irrevocably
Loses Jurisdiction over a Removed Case as Soon as the Federal
Judge Orders that the Removed Case Be Remanded
In Leslie v. Floyd Gas Co. 15 a federal district court ruled that its entry of
an order of remand immediately reinvested the state court with exclusive
jurisdiction over the removed civil lawsuit, even though no copy of that fed-
eral remand order had been filed in the state court. 16 In other words, the act
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. 11 1985).
14. See infra notes 47-99 and accompanying text.
15. 11 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Ky. 1935).
16. Id. at 402. The district court stated:
The general power of the court over its own judgments, orders, and decrees
during the existence of the term at which they are first made is undeniable, and
this general rule would be controlling here but for the statutory provision that
"such remand shall be immediately carried into execution .... When this
court entered the order remanding the case on March 20, 1935, the state court,
by operation of law, was immediately reinvested with jurisdiction.... It was the
duty of the state court to immediately proceed to exercise jurisdiction over the
cause as a pending action as though no removal had ever been attempted ....
... Whether a copy of the remanding order was filed in the state court and
subsequent proceedings taken therein does not appear material, since the state
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of ordering remand immediately and irrevocably deprived the federal district
court of jurisdiction to further consider the merits of the case. The federal
judge's oral order fully returned the case to the state court from which it
arose. 17 In this case the transfer of jurisdiction to the state court occurred at
the moment the federal judge orally ordered the case remanded, and such
transfer did not require the state court to receive a written copy of the re-
mand order to proceed with the case. 1 8 The state court therefore was em-
powered to render a final judgment without having first received a written
copy of the remand order, and the federal court was without power to recon-
sider its decision to remand the case, even though it had not yet signed that
order or sent it to the state court.
The case merits attention because other courts frequently cite it for the
proposition that a federal court lacks any power to reconsider, modify, or
vacate an order of remand.19 To reach the conclusions described above, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky miscon-
strued language from a Supreme Court decision discussing the procedure for
removal, and misapplied it to a case involving remand. 20 Nevertheless, a
number of federal courts have relied upon the same rationale as expressed in
Floyd Gas Co. in reaching the same conclusion that jurisdiction immediately
court was immediately reinvested with jurisdiction and had full authority to
proceed with the case. A different construction of the statute might work great
confusion as well as injurious delay in the preparation and trial of causes.
Id.
17. Thus, if the state court was in the middle of a trial at the time that a defendant filed a
removal petition, the federal court's oral remand order would sufficiently return the parties to
the status quo ante that had prevailed immediately prior to the filing of the removal petition in
federal court, that is, to the middle of the trial. If the federal court's remand order really had
the effect of making the removal proceedings a total nullity, then the state court would have
the duty to reconvene the trial immediately, as though no removal had ever been attempted.
Id.
The potential for abuse appears obvious: a state court judge might attempt to punish the
attorney who had originally removed the case to federal court by (1) telephoning the federal
judge who had received the removal petition and requesting a sua sponte, federal order of
remand, and (2) reconvening the trial without notifying the attorney who had filed the removal
petition. The state court might thereafter proceed to trial without the removing defendant's
counsel even being aware of the remand order, or of the reinvestment of jurisdiction in the
state court.
The state court judge could then explain that the removing party's counsel had voluntarily
abandoned the trial by leaving the court in order to engage in null proceedings in another
court. Although this hypothetical case might appear far-fetched, it pales in comparison to the
set of facts described in Adair Pipeline Co. v. Pipeliners Local Union No. 798, 203 F. Supp.
434 (S.D. Tex. 1962), aff'd, 325 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1963). In Adair a state court judge deliber-
ately disregarded a copy of a removal petition that an attorney had served upon him, purport-
edly because a literal reading of the removal statute required the attorney to file the copy of the
removal petition with the state court's clerk, rather than with the state court judge. 203 F.
Supp. at 436.
18. Floyd Gas Co., 11 F. Supp. at 402.
19. See In re La Providencia Dev. Corp., 406 F.2d 251, 253 n.2 (1st Cir. 1969); Smith v.
Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 391 F. Supp. 310, 312 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); In re Great. Petrol. Corp.,
16 F. Supp. 247, 251 (S.D. Cal. 1936); Newell v. Harrison Eng'g & Constr. Corp., 149 Kan.
838, 89 P.2d 869, 871 (1939).
20. Floyd Gas Co., 11 F. Supp. at 402 (citing St. Paul & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Mclean, 108
U.S. 212 (1883); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Koontz, 104 U.S. 5 (1881)).
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reinvests in the state court upon oral remand. 2 1
For example, a panel of the Fifth Circuit adopted the Leslie doctrine in
1933. In City of Waco v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.22 the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the remand order placed the case back in state court
in the position from which it was removed, and ended all federal court ac-
tions in the case. 23 That Fifth Circuit ruling provides little or no precedential
value, however, because Congress amended the federal remand statute a few
years later; consequently, the Waco decision has never been cited in any sub-
sequent opinion of the Fifth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit also considered the immediacy and irrevocability of a
federal remand order. In his dissent in Bucy v. Nevada Construction Co. 24
Judge Healy declared that,
[W]hen the court entered its order of November 27, 1939, "remanding
the cause to the state court for lack of jurisdiction", no further order or
action was contemplated or intended by the court to effectuate its pur-
pose. I think the judicial function of the federal court is exhausted and
its authority terminated with the entry of the remand order. What there-
after remains to be done, if anything, is not a judicial act but the per-
formance by the clerk of a purely ministerial function....
As used in the practice, the office of the certified copy is merely in-
formative .... [I]ts filing with the state court is, I think, in no sense a
prerequisite to the revesting of jurisdiction there. If an hour after a
remanding order is entered, the state court were to proceed tojudgement
in the absence of the copy, upon informal advice of counsel or upon no
advice at all, he would indeed be a hardy advocate who would contend
that the proceedings so had were without jurisdiction.25
In Judge Healy's view the very act of uttering an oral order of remand and
entering that order in the court's records constituted an act of law that im-
mediately and irrevocably returned exclusive jurisdiction to the state court,
regardless of whether the state court judge even knew that he had regained
jurisdiction over the lawsuit. Once uttered, the remand order would become
inviolate, and the return of the case to the state court would follow inexora-
21. See, e.g., Merchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 11 F.2d 368, 369 (2d Cir. 1926)
(proper practice is to send case immediately to court of proper jurisdiction); Garrison v. Atlan-
tic Life Ins. Co., 18 F. Supp. 469, 469 (E.D.S.C. 1937) (federal court's filing of remand order
deprived court of jurisdiction to entertain petition for rehearing and to vacate remand order
because whole case had been returned to state court); Ausbrooks v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
282 F. 733, 734 (M.D. Tenn. 1921) (federal remand order immediately reinvests state court
with jurisdiction, regardless of filing of copy of order).
22. 67 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1933).
23. Id. at 786. The court stated that "the entry of the remanding order rendered the order
appealed from ineffective for want of jurisdiction, made moot all further proceedings in the
federal court, and left the cause to stand and continue in the state court as though it had not
been removed." Id.
24. 125 F.2d 213, 218 (9th Cir. 1942) (Healy, J., dissenting). The majority held that,
because the federal district court erroneously remanded the case to the state court, discovered
the error, and vacated the remand before the plaintiff proceeded in state court and because the
plaintiff subsequently acquiesced to the federal district court's jurisdiction, the federal district
court correctly retained jurisdiction. Id. at 215-19.
25. Id. at 219 (emphasis added) (footnotes and citations omitted).
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bly and automatically. Though only a dissent, Justice Healy's opinion serves
to illustrate one approach to this remand issue.
At this point, one would be wise to consider the rationale of this view-
point. The doctrine that a federal court's order of remand is both irrevoca-
ble and immediate appears to go too far. Healy's statement that the transfer
of the case back to the state court would constitute nothing more than a
ministerial act must mischaracterize the law. At the very least the charac-
terization reduces to virtual insignificance the current language of 28 U.S.C.
section 1447. The statute states that once the federal court clerk mails a
certified copy of the remand order to the state court clerk, the state court
may thereupon proceed with the case.2 6 Even if one considers the filing of
the remand order in the state court as primarily informative, such filing is
not merely ministerial, for the filing represents the federal court's transfer
and surrender of exclusive jurisdiction to the state court. When a party at-
tempting to remove a case fails to file a copy of the removal petition in the
state court, that failure to perform an informative action will invalidate the
removal proceeding because the act of informing the state court that it no
longer possesses jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case actually works
to transfer jurisdiction of the case.27 Likewise, the filing of a certified copy
of the remand order in the state court informs that court, and the parties
before it, of the transfer of exclusive jurisdiction back to that state court to
decide the case.
The courts that decided the cases discussed above, with the important
Bucy exception, did so using a pre-28 U.S.C. section 1447 version of the
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. 11 1985).
27. In an effort to be fair, a proponent of immediate and irrevocable divestment might
respond by contending that the ministerial act of sending the actual remand order to state
court more closely resembles the ministerial act of filing a copy of the federal removal petition
in state court than the jurisdictional act of filing the removal petition in the federal court. A
more fundamental analysis suggests that one cannot ever describe as merely ministerial an act
that transfers the jurisdiction a court needs to decide a case. Even if one analogizes the filing
of the remand order in state court to the filing of a copy of the removal petition in state court,
describing the filing of the remand order as a purely ministerial act would be improper. Courts
view requirements that a removing party file a bond in the federal court, promptly give written
notice of the removal to opposing parties, and file a copy of the removal petition in state court
as quickly as practicable as modal and formal steps. Thus, defects in those steps do not defeat
federal jurisdiction and can be cured. See Covington v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 251 F.2d 930, 932-
33 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 921 (1958); Hornung v. Master Tank & Welding Co., 151
F. Supp. 169, 171-72 (D.N.D. 1957). But see Beleos v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 161 F. Supp.
627, 628-29 (E.D.S.C. 1956); Cavanaugh v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 103 F. Supp. 855, 855
(W.D. Mo. 1952). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 40, at 226-34 (describes removal
procedure).
One must contrast the filing of a remand order that returns jurisdiction to the state court
with the technicalities of removal, such as filing the requisite bond. The language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) authorizes the state court to "thereupon proceed with such case" only after the
federal court's clerk has mailed a certified copy of the remand order to the state court. 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982). Thus, Congress appears to have intended that either the federal court
clerk's mailing or the state court clerk's receipt of that copy of the remand order act as a
jurisdictional prerequisite to the state court's commencement of further proceedings in the
case. In addition, the remand order informs the state court about the scope, as well as the
existence, of the state court's jurisdiction. The scope of a particular remand order has become
extremely important, due to the federal judiciary's increasingly frequent use of limited and
conditional remands.
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federal remand statute. The older version mandated that the parties in-
volved immediately execute the federal court's order of remand. 28 The
Supreme Court interpreted this congressional directive of immediate execu-
tion in United States v. Rice.29 The Court ruled that the statutory prohibi-
tion, combined with the policy of refusing to interrupt litigation of the merits
of removed causes to consider questions of jurisdiction of the district court,30
precluded the federal appellate courts from reviewing an order of remand by
mandamus or appeal. 31
Congress substantially changed the older version in 1940.32 The 1940
amendments replaced the directive of immediately carrying the remand or-
der into execution with a procedure for mailing a certified copy of the federal
remand order to the state court clerk. Congress reformulated the remand
statute again in 1948. 3 3  Congress then renumbered the statute during the
recodification, 34 but did not change the statute's content. As a result of the
change in the statutory language, all of the decisions interpreting the pre-
1940 remand statute should have little or no bearing upon the proper con-
struction of the present statute.
One commentator on federal procedural law drew a distinction between
the old removal statute's immediate execution and the lack of that require-
ment in the post-1948 version. 35 Despite the substantial statutory changes
that took place in 1940, many state courts today still hold that federal courts
immediately and irrevocably lose jurisdiction over removed cases at the mo-
28. Judicial Code § 28 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 71 (1940), originally enacted as Act of March
3, 1911, ch. 231, § 38, 36 Stat. 1094 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. 11 1985)).
The pertinent part of the predecessor statute read:
Whenever any cause shall be removed from the state court into any district
court of the United States, and the district court shall decide that the cause was
improperly removed, and order the same to be remanded to the state court from
whence it came, such remand shall be immediately carried into execution, and no
appeal or writ of error from the decision of the district court so remanding such
cause shall be allowed.
Id. (emphasis added).
29. 327 U.S. 742 (1946).
30. Id. at 751.
31. Id. at 752.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 71(e) (1940) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. 11 1985). The
1940 amended version provided:
If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed im-
providently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case. A
certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by its clerk to the clerk of
the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with such case.
Id.
33. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 939 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (Supp. II
1985)).
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (Supp. 11 1985).
35. IA J. MOORE & B. RINGLE, Moore's Federal Practice, 0.169[2.-1] (2d ed. 1987).
The commentator noted that:
[u]nder the prior statute, despite the strong language to the effect that when the
district court orders the case remanded "such remand shall be immediately car-
ried into execution," it was held that this did not instantly deprive the district
court of jurisdiction .... This is true under the present statute since it does not




ment that those federal district court judges order a remand of the case to
state court.36 In Brown v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 37
for example, the defendant in a state court action removed the lawsuit to a
federal court, where he filed his original answer. Approximately three weeks
later, the federal court signed the remand order stating that the case, having
been removed to the federal court, was thereby remanded to the state
court.3 8 The federal court failed to immediately mail a copy of the remand
order to the state court, and a copy of that order did not reach the state
court until June 25, 1969, which was well after the state court had entered
summary judgment against the defendant.
The Fort Worth court of civil appeals concluded that the federal judge
signed the remand order, and that, therefore, the state trial court reacquired
jurisdiction at that time and possessed jurisdiction when rendering summary
judgment.3 9 The precedential value of the Brown v. State Farm Mutual Au-
tomobile Insurance Co. decision remains minimal, however, because the
court of civil appeals misconstrued the federal statute when it concluded that
when the federal court remands the cause, the action "ipso facto terminates
the jurisdiction of the Federal Court" and restores jurisdiction to the state
court.40 In the case the Fort Worth court of civil appeals cited three sup-
porting cases, which courts had rendered in 1936, 1921, and 1883. 4' All
three of the supporting cases held that a federal court immediately and irre-
vocably loses jurisdiction over a remanded case once the federal court orders
the remand of a case. 42 Once the court orders remand, it does not even
retain the jurisdiction necessary to modify or vacate that order.43
The Fort Worth court of civil appeals erroneously failed to recognize that
Congress had revised the federal removal and remand statute in 1940, four
years after the most recent of the decisions upon which it had relied. 44 The
three decisions that the court cited in support of its interpretation of the
statute as it appeared prior to the 1940 amendments did not resemble the
statute that the court interpreted in 1969. To summarize, those cases de-
36. Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 449 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1969, no writ); see also Reimer v. Scott, 666 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1984, writ dism'd) (adopted Brown rationale and concluded that "[tihe order of
remand terminates the jurisdiction of the federal court and immediately restores the jurisdic-
tion of the state court").
37. 449 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969, no writ).
38. Id. at 95.
39. Id. at 96.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., St. Paul & Chicago Ry. Co. v. McLean, 108 U.S. 212 (1983) (appellate court
should not disturb remand order unless court below has improperly exercised its discretion);
Ausbrooks v. Western Union Tel. Co., 282 F. 733 (M.D. Tenn. 1921) (federal court has no
power to vacate remand order); United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. City of Waco, 100 S.W.
2d 1099 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1936) (federal court instantly and irrevocably loses jurisdic-
tion upon remand), aff'd, 130 Tex. 126, 108 S.W.2d 432 (1937).
43. United States Pipe, 100 S.W. 2d at 1111 (citing with approval Ausbrooks v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 282 F. 733, 734 (M.D. Tenn. 1921) (federal court has no power to vacate
remand order)).
44. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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cided before 1940 bear little relevance to current remand issues because they
harkened back to a version of the remand statute that Congress repealed in
1940. As the case law discussed below indicates, most of the modern deci-
sions hold that the federal court does not surrender jurisdiction until it mails
the remand order to the state court, or, alternatively, until the state court's
clerk actually receives the remand order.45 The fact that the old approach
lingers to this day indicates that the courts have failed to pay attention to the
precise language of the federal remand statute.46
B. Decisions Holding that the Federal Court Does Not Lose Jurisdiction
over the Remanded Case Until the Federal Court's Clerk Places a Certified
Copy of the Federal Remand Order in the Mail
Subsequent decisions have repudiated the logic of immediate and irrevoca-
ble jurisdictional divestment described above. In Bucy v. Nevada Construc-
tion Co. ,47 for example, the Ninth Circuit: rejected Justice Healy's approach,
declaring that another court's reasoning contradicted the common law doc-
trine whereby courts possess inherent power to correct their own mistakes;
nullified the statutes enacted for that purpose; and misapplied 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 71.48 In Bucy the Ninth Circuit ruled that a federal district court re-
tained jurisdiction to correct its order of remand if it acted before the
remand order was executed, that is, prior to the filing of a certified copy of
the order in state court.49
The Bucy case demonstrates one of the reasons that would motivate a
federal district court to vacate an oral remand order. The district court origi-
nally ordered remand because it determined that it lacked jurisdiction to
adjudicate the removed lawsuit. The district judge ruled before he had
45. See infra notes 47-99 and accompanying text.
46. See Reimer v. Scott, 666 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984,
writ dism'd w.o.j.) (stating rule of immediate jurisdiction divestment on remand); Dorsey v.
State, 71 Ind. App. 408, 357 N.E.2d 280, 282-83 (1976) (state court resumes jurisdiction upon
notification of remand). Some commentators might argue that the Fifth Circuit had adopted a
modified form of this doctrine of immediate and irrevocable divestment of jurisdiction, based
upon the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Johnson v. Estelle, 625 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1980). The Johnson
case involved a defendant, a prison writ-writer, who filed two nearly identical petitions for
removal in the four days prior to the commencement of his state court trial for burglary. The
federal district court announced its remand order to the parties in the state court proceeding.
The record did not show that someone actually had delivered a certified copy of the remand
order to the state court. Nevertheless, Johnson proceeded to trial in the state court case with-
out objecting to the state court's lack of jurisdiction. After his subsequent conviction, he filed
a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming that the state court had violated his rights. Johnson
did not raise the issue of the federal court's failure to comply with the literal requirements of
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), although the Fifth Circuit considered that issue. Johnson, 625 F.2d at 77.
The Fifth Circuit reversed another federal district court's grant of habeas corpus relief and
decided the case on habeas corpus grounds, after concluding that Johnson had waived his right
to complain of the noncompliance with the remand statute by participating in the state court
trial without objection. Id.
47. 125 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1942).
48. Id. at 217 (citing Travelers' Protective Ass'n v. Smith, 71 F.2d 511, 513 (4th Cir.
1934) in which court implied that federal remand order was "executed by certificate (that is, by
sending a certified copy] to the state court").
49. Id. at 217-18.
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learned of a recent Supreme Court decision, which the Court had handed
down five days prior to the district court's remand order.50 When the dis-
trict court learned that it was entitled to hear the case, pursuant to the new
Supreme Court decision, the court vacated the remand order and denied the
motion to remand. The trial court's order vacating remand followed the
original remand order by four days.51 Circuit Judge Garrecht observed that
the statute did not state that the remand order was self-executing.5 2 Since
the federal court may act before the state clerk executes the remand order by
filing a certified copy of the remand order in state court, 53 the court may
grant a rehearing upon a showing of sufficient cause.- 4 The Fifth Circuit
adheres to the position enunciated in the Bucy decision, 55 and agrees with
Judge Garrecht's opinion that a remand order is not self-executing. 56
Lower courts have repeatedly come to the same conclusion. In Cook v.
J. C. Penney Co. 57 a federal district court ruled that it could reconsider its
order to remand a case to state court, because the clerk of the federal court
had failed to mail a certified copy of the remand order to state court.58 The
federal district court had ordered a case remanded on January 7, 1983, be-
cause the removal petition had failed to properly allege the existence of di-
versity jurisdiction. Although the court had already entered the order, the
federal court's clerk made a mistake and failed to send a certified copy of the
order to the state court. On January 12, 1983, the defendant sought leave to
amend its removal petition in order to correct the defects within it. The
federal court agreed to consider the request because the federal court contin-
ued to have jurisdiction due to the clerk's failure to send a copy of the re-
mand order to the state court.59 Since the defendant's defective pleadings
involved matters of form rather than of substance, and because the district
court judge rather than opposing counsel noticed those defects, the court
weighed the equities and concluded that the original order of remand had
50. Nierbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
51. See Bucy, 125 F.2d at 215-16 (details time frame).
52. Id. at 217.
53. Id. at 217-18.
54. Id. at 218.
55. See Browning v. Navarro, 743 F.2d 1069, 1078 (5th Cir. 1984) (remand order did not
self-execute, but executed upon mailing of certified copy).
56. Id. at 1078-79.
57. 558 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Iowa 1983).
58. Id. at 79. The court stated that:
[T]he federal court is not completely divested of jurisdiction to reconsider or
vacate the order of remand until the order of remand has been entered and a
certified copy of the order has been mailed to the clerk of the state court.
Here the order of remand was entered of record on January 7, 1983. Nor-
mally, a certified copy should have been mailed to the clerk of state court on the
same date. However, due to a mistake in the federal Clerk of Court's office, as
of this date, no such copy has been sent. Thus, this court has not been divested of
jurisdiction and may reconsider the order of remand.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The fact that jurisdiction did not transfer until the
remand order was mailed to the state court implicitly rejects Judge Healy's description of the
transmittal of a remand order as a purely ministerial act. See supra notes 24-27 and accompa-
nying text.
59. J.C. Penney, 558 F. Supp. at 79-80.
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been ill-advised. 60 The narrowest interpretation of the statutory language
supports the J. C. Penney court's holding that a federal court does not sur-
render jurisdiction until the state court clerk receives the remand order.
Other cases, however, hold that the federal court does not surrender jurisdic-
tion until the federal court clerk has placed the order of remand in a reposi-
tory of the U.S. Post Office. 6 1
In First National Bank v. Langford,62 for example, the federal court va-
cated a June 15, 1983, order of remand on June 23, 1983. The authors re-
main uncertain as to whether that federal court concluded that it retained
jurisdiction because it had not yet mailed the remand order, or merely be-
cause the state court had not yet received the order. Presumably, though, a
delay in entering or mailing that order enabled the federal court to vacate an
order that the state court had not yet received.
The First National Bank decision also involved an interpretation of section
1447(d), 63 which declared that an order remanding a case back to the state
court was not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.64 Courts universally rec-
ognize that an appellate court cannot review a district court's order remand-
ing a case back to the state court on appeal. 65 An appellate court can review
a federal district court's order of remand only on mandamus, when the dis-
trict court has exceeded its authority by remanding a case for some reason
not authorized by the statute, for example, the overcrowded nature of the
removal court's docket. 66
In First National Bank the district court decided to vacate its June 15,
1983, remand order on June 23, 1983, because the district court believed
information in the defendant's "previously filed and timely papers setting
forth the basis entitling it to denial of the bank's argument to remand the
case."' 67 The defendant submitted those papers to the court five days after
the original order of remand. The plaintiff objected to the district court's
reconsideration of its previous order of remand, which occurred as a result
of the defendant's June 20, 1983, motion. The plaintiff complained that the
district court's reconsideration of its earlier remand order constituted a vio-
lation of section 1447(d)'s declaration that an "order remanding a case... is
not reviewable on appeal or otherwise."' 68 The district court rejected that
argument and concluded that the court possessed jurisdiction to reconsider
60. Id. at 80.
61. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
62. 570 F. Supp. 697 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (Supp. 11 1985).
64. First Natl Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 697.
65. See Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723, 723-24 (1977) (court of ap-
peals cannot review remand); Royal v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 685 F.2d 124, 126-27
(5th Cir. 1982) (remand due to improvident removal or improper jurisdiction not subject to
review by appellate court). The statute prohibits not only federal appellate court review of the
federal district court decision, but also Supreme Court review of a final judgment in the highest
court of the state to which the case was remanded. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens,
312 U.S. 563, 568 (1941).
66. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343-44 (1976).
67. First Nat7 Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 698.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (Supp. 11 1985).
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its remand order, because the federal court was not reviewing the order, on
appeal or by mandamus. 69 The court concluded that the statute prohibited
appellate review in order to avoid jurisdictional interruptions. 70 Since a dis-
trict court's immediate reconsideration of an order that it had rendered on
incomplete information would not result in prolonged litigation over ques-
tions of the district court's jurisdiction, however, that rationale did not apply
to the First National Bank case. 71 Thus, the First National Bank decision
stands for the proposition that a federal district court can reconsider, mod-
ify, or vacate an order of remand at any time before the state court regains
jurisdiction, which apparently occurs when the state court receives a copy of
the remand order, if the party opposing remand can convince the federal
court that the court order to remand was ill-founded or based on incomplete
information.
In a series of other cases federal courts have intimated that remand does
not occur until the federal district court has mailed a certified copy to the
state court, at which time the state court regains jurisdiction. In Browning v.
Navarro,72 for example, a panel of the Fifth Circuit declared that once the
federal court mails a certified copy of the order to the clerk of the state
court, the federal court loses jurisdiction.73 Other federal courts have ar-
rived at almost identical conclusions in FDIC v. Santiago Plaza,74 In re La
Providencia Development Corp. ,7 and Rosenberg v. G. V W. Travel, Inc. 76
In In re La Providencia Development Corp. the plaintiffs commenced an
original cause of action in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico. One month
later, in July 1968, all of the defendants except one filed a petition to remove
the action to the district court on the ground of diversity. The plaintiff-
petitioners filed a motion to remand, which the court granted on August 19,
1968. Almost immediately thereafter, the plaintiff-petitioners filed a copy of
the remand order in the Puerto Rico court. The Puerto Rico court resumed
jurisdiction. The federal court shortly thereafter reconsidered its remand
order and entered an order purporting to vacate the remand on September
25, 1968. The plaintiff-petitioners filed an appeal from the federal district
court orders, and the First Circuit intervened to stay any further action by
the federal district court.
The First Circuit ruled that the federal district court had lost the jurisdic-
tion necessary to reconsider and vacate its previous order of remand. 77 The
69. First Nat'l Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 698.
70. Id. at 698.
71. Id.
72. 743 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1984).
73. Id. at 1078. The court noted that a "federal court is completely divested ofjurisdiction
once it mails a certified copy of the order to the clerk of the State court." Id. (emphasis added).
74. 598 F.2d 634, 636 (lst Cir. 1979).
75. 406 F.2d 251, 252-53 (1st Cir. 1969).
76. 480 F. Supp. 95, 97 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In dictum, the court noted in a footnote that
"[e]ntry of an order of remand and mailing a certified copy to the State Court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) completely divests the federal court ofjurisdiction and reinvests the State Court with
jurisdiction to proceed." 480 F. Supp. at 97 n.3 (citing United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742,
(1946)).
77. La Providencia, 406 F.2d at 252-53.
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appellate court attached importance to the fact that the state court had actu-
ally received the federal district court's remand order, and had reassumed
jurisdiction over the case. 78 The First Circuit concluded that appellate re-
view of a remand order was impermissible, either by appeal or pursuant to
an order of remand. 79 The court commented that "[t]his is not only in the
interest of judicial economy, but out of respect for the state court and in
recognition of principles of comity. The action must not ricochet back and
forth depending upon the most recent determination of a federal court." 80
The First Circuit's opinion did not address the question of when the state
court reacquired jurisdiction, since clearly the state court actually had re-
ceived the remand order before the federal district court could vacate that
order. Still, the First Circuit recognized that one exception to the general
rule that remand orders cannot be reviewed by appeal or otherwise could
exist. 8 1 That exception would apply "when the remand order has not been
completed by the re-entry of the case in the state court,"' 82 for example,
when the state court had not yet received the federal district court's remand
order.
In Poindexter v. Gross & Janes Co. 8 3 the court indicated that, in order to
divest a federal court of jurisdiction, the entry of the remand order and its
mailing to the state court were necessary. 84 The Poindexter case, however,
contains some ambiguity since one can also cite Poindexter in support of the
broader proposition that a federal court does not surrender jurisdiction over
the removed case until and unless the state court receives the federal court's
remand order. In Poindexter James Albert Poindexter and Peggy Jean
Poindexter brought a wrongful death action against the Gross & Janes Com-
pany, a Missouri corporation that had its principal place of business located
in Arkansas. The Poindexters filed their complaint on September 15, 1958,
in the Circuit Court of Oachita County, Arkansas. The defendant filed a
removal petition and an original answer in the federal court on October 6,
1958. Gross & James Company petitioned for removal on the grounds that
the case sounded in federal diversity jurisdiction, even though their answer
admitted that Arkansas was the company's principal place of business.
The plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the next day, on October 7, 1958,
and advised the federal court that it had no jurisdiction over the removed
case because the defendant had judicially admitted in its answer that its prin-
cipal place of business was in Arkansas, the plaintiffs' forum state. On Octo-
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 252. Federal courts avoid reviewing district court orders of remand on the
grounds that the prolonged delays that would result from litigation over questions of the dis-
trict court's jurisdiction would unduly interrupt the orderly process of a civil suit. See Therm-
tron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351 (1976); United States v. Rice, 327 U.S.
742, 751 (1946); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hayda, 637 F.2d 391, 396 n.9
(5th Cir. 1981).
81. La Providencia, 406 F.2d at 252.
82. Id.
83. 167 F. Supp. 151 (W.D. Ark. 1958).
84. Id. at 155.
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ber 14, 1958, the federal court granted the motion to remand, and the federal
judge wrote a letter to all counsel of record informing them of the basis of
his decision. The judge also entered an order of remand and caused the
federal court's clerk to file a certified copy of that remand order in the state
court. All of the court's actions took place on the same day. 85 On October
30, 1958, Gross & James filed a motion requesting the federal court to set
aside the October 14, 1958, order of remand, on the grounds that its answer
had admitted only that the company was a Missouri corporation, but not
that its principal place of business was in Arkansas.
The federal court denied that motion to set aside because of its conclusion
that the order of remand divested the court of the jurisdiction necessary to
entertain the defendant's motion. 86 Thus, the state clerk's receipt of a certi-
fied copy of that remand order on October 14, 1958, divested the federal
court of power to consider the defendant's motion to set aside, which the
defendant filed sixteen days later. Since the federal court's clerk apparently
certified a copy of the remand order and mailed it to the state clerk on that
same day, the federal court's refusal to engage in an unnecessary attempt to
determine precisely when the federal court surrendered jurisdiction over the
case is not surprising.
Even when federal judges have not explicitly addressed the issue of juris-
diction over the remanded case, those judges apparently believed that the
mailing of the remand order constituted an essential element of the remand
process. 87  In fact, the usual order of remand explicitly directs the federal
court clerk to make a certified copy of the remand order and to send it to the
clerk of the state court from which the case was originally removed. 88 Thus,
if the federal court does not lose jurisdiction over the removed case until the
federal court's clerk actually places a signed copy of the remand order in a
85. The opinion is unclear as to how that "filing" occurred, although the state court ap-
parently received the order on the date the federal court clerk mailed it. Id. at 154.
86. Id. The court noted that:
Ordinarily a court has inherent power to vacate or modify its own orders
upon a timely application for such orders, but because of the rule that the fed-
eral court loses jurisdiction after remand and the petition for removal becomes
"functus officio", the court is without jurisdiction to set aside an order remand-
ing the cause to the state court. Particularly is this true if the state court has
been notified of the entry of the order remanding the case to it. The record shows
that the Clerk of this Court filed a certified copy of the order with the Clerk of the
Circuit Court of Ouachita County, Arkansas, on October 14, 1958, the date of its
entry.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
87. See E.D. Sys. Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Tel., 674 F.2d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1982). The
Fifth Circuit panel approvingly observed that "[w]hen Judge Hughes remanded the divorce
action, she ordered that 'the clerk of [the federal] Court make a certified copy of the motion to
remand and this order and that she forward the same to the clerk of the 303rd Judicial District
of Dallas County, Texas.'" Id.
88. See City of Winston-Salem v. Chauffeurs, 470 F. Supp.442, 449 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
The court stated, "it is therefore recommended that plaintiff's motion to remand be granted
and that pursuant to the provisions of 28 USC. § 1447(c), the clerk of this Court will mail a
certified copy of the Order of Remand to the Clerk of the Superior Court of Forsyth County,
North Carolina." Id. (emphasis added); see also Hook v. Hook & Ackerman, Inc., 96 F.
Supp. 1021, 1022 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (court stated, "And now .... as required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) the . . . case will be, and hereby is, remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of
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repository of the United States mail for delivery to the clerk of the state
court, then the federal court retains jurisdiction to consider an ill-advised
oral order to remand a case. Since a federal judge possesses the inherent
power to order the remand of a case sua sponte,8 9 a federal district court
judge may have good reason to reconsider a hasty or an ill-informed deci-
sion, especially in circumstances in which the district court judge acted with-
out entertaining the argument of counsel. 90 If the federal court immediately
and irrevocably loses jurisdiction at the moment that the court orally orders
the remand of a removed case, then it possesses no power to correct an un-
wise decision. 91 If the remand statute is construed to require not only an
oral order of remand, but also the mailing of a written remand order, how-
ever, then the federal court retains jurisdiction until such time as the federal
court clerk places a certified copy of the federal remand order in a repository
of the United States mail, if not longer.9 2
C. Decisions Holding that the Federal Court is Not Deprived of
Jurisdiction Until the State Court's Clerk Receives a Certified
Copy of the Federal Remand Order
Not all federal courts agree that they lose jurisdiction upon the mailing of
the remand order. In another line of decisions federal district courts have
stated or implied that a federal court retains jurisdiction over a removed case
until the state court's clerk actually receives a certified copy of the federal
remand order. 93 In some of those cases, the district court has explicitly
stated that the state court does not actually regain jurisdiction until its clerk
receives the certified copy of the remand order that the federal court's clerk
had placed in the mail, pursuant to the procedure set forth at 28 U.S.C.
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, with costs, and the clerk is directed to mail a certified copy
of this order to the Prothonotary of that Court ....").
These literal interpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. 11 1985) find support in James
W. Moore's and Brett A. Ringle's summary of the applicable jurisdiction, when they made the
following observation:
Under the prior statute, despite the strong language to the effect that when the
district court orders the case remanded "such demand shall be immediately car-
ried into execution," it was held that this did not instantly deprive the district
court of jurisdiction. This meant that steps were to be taken promptly to carry
the remand into effect, but until these steps were taken the district court had
power to vacate its order. This is true under the present statute since it does not
command immediate execution of the remand order. But the entry of the order of
remand and the mailing of a certified copy to the clerk of the state court com-
pletely divests the federal court of jurisdiction so that it is powerless to vacate the
order of remand.
J. MOORE & B. RINGLE, supra note 35, 0.169 (2.-], at 696-97 (emphasis added).
89. See Trent Realty Assoc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 657 F.2d 29, 36 (3d Cir.
1981); Murdock v. Safety Casualty Co., 138 F. Supp. 145, 147 (S.D. Tex. 1956).
90. Three J Farms, Inc. v. Alton Box Bd. Co., 609 F.2d 112, 114, (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980).
91. Leslie v. Floyd Gas Co., 11 F. Supp. 401, 402 (E.D. Ky. 1935).
92. First Nat'l Bank v. Langford, 570 F. Supp. 697, 698 (S.D. Fla. 1983).




In Yarborough v. Blake,95 for example, the United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas observed that "upon receipt by the
Clerk of the State court of the certified copy of the order, the State court was
authorized to proceed with the case."'96 In the much older case of Empire
Mining Co. v. Propeller Tow-Boat Co. 97 a federal district court and a state
court vigorously disputed the issue of jurisdiction after the federal district
court had attempted to vacate an order of remand that had returned a re-
moved case to the state court from where it came. In the state court pro-
ceeding the defendant asked to remove the case to the United States Circuit
Court for the District of South Carolina on December 17, 1898. Subse-
quently, the plaintiff filed a motion to remand, which the federal court
granted on May 22, 1899. On that same day, the state clerk filed a certified
copy of the remand order in the state court. The state court thereupon re-
sumed jurisdiction. On June 7, 1899, the federal court vacated that order of
remand and sought to regain jurisdiction over the case, which the state court
refused. The state court refused to surrender jurisdiction because it con-
tended that the federal court had lost jurisdiction over the case when the
state court filed the remand order. The state court argued:
The moment the order of remand was executed by filing in the state
court, the jurisdiction of the federal court was yielded, and the jurisdic-
tion of the state court, which had been suspended by the removal to the
federal court, was restored, or became again operative in the cause. It
was then not only the right, but the duty, of the state court to proceed
with the cause. Some steps had been taken in the state court after the
filing of the order of remand and before the filing of the order vacating,
and it is hardly conceivable that, if judgment had been rendered in the
interim, it would be void for want of jurisdiction, since jurisdiction was
restored by the order of remand. It being the duty of the state court to
accept the order of remand as final, and proceed with the cause, its
jurisdiction could in no wise be affected by the vacating order, which
was made after the federal court had lost possession and control of the
cause. 98
This discussion of the effect of a state court's receipt of a federal remand
order on the federal court's right to reconsider, modify, or vacate its order of
remand is as intelligent and applicable today as when the court wrote it
almost eighty-seven years ago. Although disputes can arise as to whether
the state court is right to resume jurisdiction after the federal court's mailing
of a remand order, clearly the state court may reassert its jurisdiction once
its clerk has actually received and file-stamped the federal court's remand
94. For a discussion of the potential effect of this receipt analysis, see infra notes 97-98
and accompanying text.
95. 212 F. Supp. 133 (W.D. Ark. 1962).
96. Id. at 145.
97. 108 F. 900 (C.C.D.S.C. 1901).
98. Chisholm v. Propeller Tow-Boat Co., 59 S.C. 549, 550, 38 S.E. 156, 157 (1901); cf.
Travelers' Protective Ass'n v. Smith, 71 F.2d 511, 513 (4th Cir. 1934) (court stated that re-




IV. AN ARGUMENT FOR DETERMINING THAT A FEDERAL COURT
DOES NOT LOSE JURISDICTION OVER A REMOVED CASE
UNTIL THE STATE COURT'S CLERK ACTUALLY
RECEIVES A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE
FEDERAL COURT'S REMAND ORDER
Federal courts have ruled that state courts are reinvested with jurisdiction
over a case that had been removed from that state court on three separate
occasions:
(1) immediately upon the oral order of the federal court to remand the
case to the state court; 1° °
(2) upon the federal court clerk's mailing of the federal remand order to
the state court; and ° 1
(3) upon the state court's receipt of the federal remand order. 10 2
One can make a few generalizations about the cases described above. Since
Congress enacted the Judicial Code in 1940,103 no federal court has ruled
that an oral order of remand immediately and irrevocably divests a federal
court of jurisdiction over a case removed from a state court. This absence of
case law reflects the change effected by the 1948 amendment, 104 when the
legislature replaced the statutory commandment that the remand "shall be
immediately carried into execution"' 1 5 with language requiring the federal
court's clerk to mail "[a] certified copy of the order of remand ... to the
clerk of the State court," so that the state court could "thereupon proceed
with such case."' 10 6
As one federal appellate court declared, the remand procedure under the
current statute "is not self-executing." 10 7 The remand statute requires more
than a mere oral order. The statute requires the written entry of that order
and the mailing of that order to state court.10 8 State courts that have con-
99. See Three I Farms, Inc. v. Alton Box Bd. Co., 609 F.2d 112, 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1979)
(federal court cannot vacate remand order and retrieve file allegedly mistakenly returned to
state court thirteen days after federal court's clerk forwarded original pleadings and certified
copy of docket entries to state court, which had presumably resumed proceedings in case), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); FDIC v. Santiago Plaza, 598 F.2d 634, 636 (1st Cir. 1979) (re-
versing federal district court's order vacating remand and staying proceedings in Puerto Rico
court that occurred four months after federal district remanded case to Puerto Rico court,
because "the state court's jurisdiction, however it may be measured, had resumed"); State v.
Lehman, 203 Neb. 341, 278 N.W.2d 610, 615 (1979) (jurisdiction of state court restored after
receipt of federal remand order).
100. See supra notes 15-46 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 47-92 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
103. 28 U.S.C. §§ 51-2254 (1940) (current version in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
104. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 939 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (Supp. II
1985)).
105. 28 U.S.C. §§ 71, 80 (1940) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. 11 1985)).
106. Id. § 1447(c) (Supp. 11 1985) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 71, 80 (1940)).
107. Browning v. Navarro, 743 F.2d 1069, 1078 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Bucy v. Nevada
Constr. Co., 125 F.2d 213, 217-18 (9th Cir. 1942)).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. 11 1985).
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strued the statute to immediately and irrevocably divest the federal court of
jurisdiction over the removed case10 9 simply have failed to recognize that the
case law upon which they have relied is inapplicable to the law as it now
appears on the books.
Although a number of old federal court cases squarely held that an order
of remand immediately and irrevocably divests the federal court of jurisdic-
tion, and therefore imply that such an order is "self-executing," ' l10 one can,
and now should, disregard those cases.because the courts decided them
under a prior statute that has since been changed substantially. We can
therefore conclude that federal court judges do not surrender their jurisdic-
tion over a removed case merely by advising the parties or their counsel that
the court will return the lawsuit to the state court. Instead, the federal dis-
trict court judge must enter a written order of remand in the federal court's
docket, and then cause the federal court's clerk to mail a certified copy of
that remand order to the state court from which the case was removed."'
Several consequences result from this analysis of the old federal cases and
the newer state court cases. Because the federal court judge does not surren-
der jurisdiction until he has entered the remand order and caused his clerk
to mail a certified copy of it to the state court, the judge remains free to
reverse or modify his earlier order of remand at any time prior to the mailing
or, alternatively, the actual delivery, of the certified copy of the remand or-
der to the state court. Often one or several days will elapse between the time
that the federal court first considers the issue of remand, sua sponte or at the
request of the plaintiff, and the time that the clerk actually sends a certified
copy of the remand order to the state court. Astute defense counsel will use
this time in order to file a motion requesting the court to reconsider or to
vacate this original remand order.
Considerations of policy favor a federal court's retention of jurisdiction
until the federal court clerk mails a copy of the remand order to state court.
Not only does this judicial construction comport with the statutory lan-
guage, it also enables the federal district court judge to render an intelligent
and well advised decision. This intelligent decision will arise because the
judge possesses an opportunity to reconsider, modify, or vacate the remand
order that otherwise would not be available. Review of the case law reveals
that federal courts have taken the opportunity to correct hasty or ill-advised
decisions.1 2 Since no opportunity exists for an appeal or a mandamus once
the state court has resumed jurisdiction over the remanded case, the federal




One could argue that the federal court's retention of jurisdiction does not
accord with the policy that requires federal courts to construe strictly the
109. See Reimer v. Scott, 666 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984,
writ dism'd).
110. See supra notes 15-46 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 47-92 and accompanying text.
112. Bucy v. Nevada Constr. Co., 125 F.2d 213, 217 (9th Cir. 1942); Cook v. J.C. Penney
Co., 558 F. Supp. 78, 79 (N.D. Iowa 1983).
113. In re La Providencia Dev. Corp., 406 F.2d 251, 253 (1st Cir. 1969).
1018 [Vol. 41
REMOVAL AND REMAND
right to remove a state court lawsuit to a federal court. 1 4 If an oral order of
remand is both immediate and irrevocable, then improvidently removed
cases would be expeditiously returned to the state courts from where they
came, without any possibility for the federal court to regain jurisdiction over
the case by vacating or modifying an ill-advised or hasty order. This ap-
proach would reduce the federal judiciary's caseload of removed cases, and
also shorten the time that an improvidently removed case would remain in
federal court prior to its remand to state court. As laudable as these goals
appear, however, the means used to achieve them appear inappropriate. In a
large number of cases a party should never remove to a federal court. Fur-
thermore, the improper removal of a case can seriously disrupt a state
court's trial procedures. 1 5 When the removal has been improper, the delays
and expenses associated with the removal can threaten the comity between
federal and state courts. 116 The solution, however, should not deprive a fed-
eral district court judge of the right to correct a mistake.
The proper manner in which to discourage wrongful removals makes the
attorneys who file meritless removal petitions pay dearly for the privilege.
Courts may accomplish this by assessing attorney's fees pursuant to rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. section 1927. If the
federal court considering the defendant's right to removal determines that
the removal petition is well grounded in fact, and that existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law
warrants removal, then the court should not impose sanctions, even if the
federal court returns the case to state court.' 17 If the court concludes that a
party's counsel removed a case solely to impede justice or to delay the entry
of a verdict, then the court should sanction the lawyer severely. In one re-
cent case, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a sanctions award in the amount of
$38,843.99 because the court found that the removal petition had not been
well grounded in law or fact. 118 Federal court sanctions of this kind will
deter attorneys from filing wrongful removals and will punish them if they
are not deterred.
To summarize, a federal court's order of remand is not self-executing.
The federal court must enter the order of remand and mail it to the state
court from which the case was removed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section
114. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Brown, 535 F. Supp. 486, 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982); McCurtain
County Prod. Corp. v. Cowett, 482 F. Supp. 809, 812 (E.D. Okla. 1978).
115. Ramahi v. Hobart Corp., 47 Or. App. 607, 615 P.2d 348, 351-52 (1980); see also
Natural Gas Pipeline v. White, 436 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968) (com-
menting upon procedure nullity of plaintiff's attempt to remove civil case to federal court),
aff'd on other grounds, 444 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1969).
116. Ramahi v. Hobart Corp., 47 Or. App. 607, 615 F.2d 348, 351-52 (1980); see also
FDIC v. Santiago Plaza, 598 F.2d 634, 636 (1st Cir. 1979) (court considers comity between
federal and state courts in decision); In re La Providencia Dev. Corp., 406 F.2d 251, 253 (1st
Cir. 1969) (court added that comity between federal and state courts is factor to be considered
in mandamus proceeding, but is not determinative factor).
117. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
118. Davis v.Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d 494, 496-97 (5th Cir. 1985); cf Schwarz v. Folloder,
767 F.2d 125, 133-34 (5th Cir. 1985) (vacating and remanding federal district court's denial of
defendant's motion for attorney's fees under FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1980)).
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1447(c). A state court, accordingly, does not regain jurisdiction over a re-
moved case until either: (1) the federal court's clerk mails, or otherwise
sends, a certified copy of the remand order to the state court, or (2) the state
court's clerk actually receives the copy of the federal court's remand or-
der. '19 Even if the federal district judge has ruled and entered the remand
order in the docket, the failure of the federal court clerk to mail the order of
remand to the state court enables the federal court to retain jurisdiction over
the case and to vacate its original order of remand.' 20 In the interim be-
tween the federal district judge's oral order of remand and the federal court
clerk's execution of the remand order, the federal court judge may recon-
sider, modify, or vacate the remand order.
Clearly, therefore, the state court does not regain jurisdiction over the
remanded lawsuit until the remand order is executed by certification to the
state court. Certification to the state court can occur either at the time of the
remand order's mailing or at the time of its receipt.' 2 1 When the federal
court places the order in the mail a delay of one to several days ensues. The
period is sometimes longer in a large metropolitan area, or when the federal
court is located at a considerable distance from the state court from which
the defendant removed the case. A defendant may enjoy an even longer
respite if the federal court mailed the order on a Friday. 122 The delay can be
significant, for aggressive defense counsel can utilize this brief period of time
to file an emergency motion for reconsideration of the order granting re-
mand. If the federal court has acted sua sponte or has ruled hastily on the
basis of incomplete information, the delay in mailing offers defense counsel a
final opportunity to take the "one shot" that removal offers.
Although a federal court's retention of jurisdiction over a case until the
moment that a copy of the remand order arrives at the state court will in-
crease the number of removed cases that remain in federal court, this does
not mean that retention of jurisdiction conflicts with the policy of strict con-
struction that governs removal cases. 123  A policy of strict construction
should not countenance erroneous interpretation. If the federal court has
mistakenly remanded a case to state court, the federal court should have
every opportunity to eliminate the error in the period before the state court
resumes proceedings.
Retention of federal jurisdiction over a removed case until the time that
the state court actually receives the federal court's remand order makes
sense for a number of reasons. A requirement that the state court forgo
proceedings until the state court clerk files the remand order allows the fed-
eral court's remand order to become part of the state court's record.124 The
presence of the remand order in the state court's record is particularly im-
119. See supra text accompanying notes 47-99.
120. Cook v. J.C. Penney Co., 558 F. Supp. 78, 79 (N.D. Iowa 1983).
121. See supra notes 47-99 and accompanying text.
122. See First Nat'l Bank v. Langford, 570 F. Supp. 697,.698 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
123. See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
124. E.D. Sys. Corp. v. Southwestern Bell-Tel., 674 F.2d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1982).
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portant if the federal court has ordered a partial order of remand 125 or a
conditional order of remand. 126 These conditional remand orders have been
appearing with greater frequency in recent years. 127 Needless to say, the
state court judge should read the federal court's remand order before re-
convening proceedings, if for no other reason than to determine if the state
court's jurisdiction over the case is restricted or conditioned upon a specific
set of circumstances.
Furthermore, requiring the state court to forgo any further action until it
receives the federal court's remand gives all of the parties a better opportu-
nity to resume the state court proceedings in an orderly and timely fashion.
Although a state court judge could resume proceedings without advising the
defendant's counsel of those resumed proceedings, the defendant's counsel
would likely have had an opportunity to learn of the federal court's action
and to prepare for trial. This result comports with the due process require-
ment that a party obtain an opportunity to be heard "appropriate to the
nature of the case." 128  Thus, considerations of policy and the canons of
statutory construction strongly suggest that a federal court is not divested of
jurisdiction over a removed case until the state court clerk receives and files
a copy of the federal court's remand order.
125. Id. at 458; see also In re Calabria, 5 Bankr. 73, 75 (D. Conn. 1980) (court remanded
basic foreclosure action to state court except portion that determined bankrupt's real estate
exemption and avoidance of any judicial liens upon property).
126. Rule 11 (f) of the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
discussed conditional remand orders extensively. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
§ 5.22 (pt. 2), at 340 (1982) (supplement to C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE (1969-1985); see also In re A.H. Robins Co., 453 F. Supp. 108, 109 n.2
(J.P.M.L. 1978) (discussing decision to utilize show cause proceeding rather than rule 1 l(f),
J.P.M.L. conditional remand order). The Fifth Circuit has questioned the validity of condi-
tional remand orders. Browning v. Navarro, 743 F.2d 1069, 1079 (5th Cir. 1984). Judge Ran-
dall observed that "[c]onditional remand orders seem to be contrary to the principles
underlying the concept of remand." Id. One bankruptcy court in Texas has construed that
decision as rejecting the validity of conditional remand orders. See In re Pacific Tuna Corp.,
48 Bankr. 74, 78 (W.D. Tex. 1985).
127. Browning v. Navarro, 743 F.2d 1069, 1079-80 & n.29 (5th Cir. 1984).
128. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
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